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Pg. 1

Inmate Name
IDOC No.
Address

David Dalrymple

74871
Kit Carson Correctional center
PO. Box 2000
Burlington, Co. 80807

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 9th JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
David Dalrymple
petitioner

Case No. H0301506 & H0301629

vs.

State Of Idaho
respondent

SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.

Pg.2

STATEMENT OF FACT.
Throughout all of the legal proceedings that have taken place
in this matter-including trial, appeal from convictions that
resulted at trial, the subsequent post-conviction proceedings, the
appeal from those post-conviction findings, and now this successive
post-conviction- Mr.Dalrymple has steadfastly alledged that he is
not guilty of the sexual molestation charges because he had only
hypnotized Kelsea Breton to believe that she has been molested,but
in fact she had never been actually physically molested by him.
Dalrymple alledged that he performed this hypnosis upon Kelsea
in order to keep her safe. On professional and ethical grounds
Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel disagreed with Mr.Dalrymple concerning
the presentation of a defense, and the presentation of any defense
evidence in respect to the possible hypnosis of Kelsea Breton.
(see Trial Tr. pg.349,thru 353) and (P.C.Tr.pg.1]7,L.10 to pg.117)
At the close of the May 2004 trial Dalrymple protested to the court
that his trial councel had not presented his hypnosis defense.
(Trial Tr.pg.395,thru406.)
The trial court listened to the rationale for not presenting
the hypnosis defense thathad beenproffered by Mr.Dalrymple. The
court then allowed defense councel to further undermine Dalrymple's
defense by claiming a "conflict" preverited.him from presenting
or investigating Dalrymple's defense. The court then gave Dalrymple
the ultimatum to either discharge his attorney in order and proceed
pro-se if he wished to present evidense, or, keep D'Angelo as his
counsel and concede that the case was now closed.(Trial Tr.pg.407,
408)
Dalrymple was unsuccesfull at his Post Conviction hearing
largely due to his now paid attorney's inability to find an expert
in hypnosis, and his negligence with the issues.
Dalrymple askes that the Court Overturn his Convictions in full,
Vacate his Senteces, and, Remand.
Thank You, Respectfully,

Pg.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
An applicant for post conviction relief has the burden of
proving, by preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which
the claim is based. Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c);Estes v.State,111
Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141(1986);Clark v. State,92 Idaho 827,
830, 452 P.2d 54,57(1969).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be properly
brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v.State,
121 Idaho 918,924-25, 828 P.2d 1323,1329-30(Ct.App.1992)
A successive petition for ineffective assistance of counsel
may also be brought under the post-conviction act, as post conviction
is the petition designed to address ineffective counsel issues.
Martinez v. Ryan,u.s. Court Of Appeals (9th Cir. 2012) Without
adequete representation in an initial-review collateral proceeding
a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating ineffective
assistance at trial claim. The same would be true if the state did
not appoint an attorney for the initial-review collateral proceeding
A prisoner's inability to present an ineffective-assistance claim
is of a particular concern because the right to effective trial
counsel is a bedrock principal in this nation's justice system.
To prvail_on an.ineffective assistance of counsel claim,the
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient
and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiancy. Strckland
v, Washington,466 U.S.668,687-88(1984);Hassett v.State,127 Idaho
313,316,900 P.2d 221,224(Ct.App.1995) To establish a deficiency,
the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Aragon v.State,114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174,1176(1998) To establish
prejudice,the applicant must show a reasonable probability that,
but for the attorney's defitiant performance, the outcome of the
trial would have been different.Id.at 761,760 P.2d at 1177. Tactical
or strategic decisions of counsel will not be second guessed unless
those decisions are based on inadeguete preperation, ignorance
of
z..:..:::::
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
Howard v. State,126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263(Ct.App.1994)
THE UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION ACT is" the exclusive means for
challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence" other than
by direct appeal.Rhoades v. State,148 Idaho 215,217,220 P3d 571,573
(2009)

Pg.4
ISSUES PRESENTED.

#1

Dalrymple was denied effective assistance of counsel as a
result of his trial counsel's failure to request a pre-trial
proceeding to determine both the existence, and the potential
prejudicial effect of, confabulated witness testimony arising from
hypnotic suggestion.
ISSUE #2

Dalrymple was deprived of his right to confront and cross
examine his accusers.
ISSUE #3

Involuntary and Untimley Waiver to Proceed Pro-Se.
ISSUE.#4

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due To
Conflict of Interest.
ISSUE #5
Constructive Denial of Counsel.
ISSUE #6

Incompetent to Stand Trial.
ISSUE #7

Counsel's Cumulative Errors.
ISSUE #8
ABUSE OF Disccretion
ISSUE #9

INEFFECTIVE Assistance by Counsel on Collateral Proceeding.
ISSUE #10

Dalrymple was deprived of his 5th Amendment Right of Due Process
His 6th Amendment Right of Confrontation, and, CompulsoryProcess, and, Counsel for his Defense.
HiS~Bt~iAmendment Right that Excessive Bail shall not be Required,
Nor Excessive Fines Imposed, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted. and,

Dalrymple has been DEprived of his 14th

Amendment Rights thru DEprovation of Liberty Without Due Process,
and the constructive Denial of Equal Protection of the Law.

ISSUE

Dalrymple was Denied Effective Assistance of Council at trial
as a result of his trial councel's failure to investigate, and
failure to request the pre-trial procedure for the determination
of the existence of,and potentially prejudicial effect of, witness
testimony arising from hypnotic suggestoin.
Dalrymple has consistently maintained that he never commited
any of the physical acts upon Kelsea that were the basis for his
conviction of the sexual molestation charges. He has consistently
maintained that Kelsea's testimony at trial was the result of
false memories of sexual molestation that Dalrymple had placed in
Kelsea's mind as the result of hypnosis.
Dalrymple clearly wanted to present hypnosis, and evidence of
hypnosis as the foundation of his defense. Mr.DeAngelo's failure
to investigate left Dalrymple unprepaired. Mr.DeAngelo addmitts at
the questioning of the court that he doesn't understand how to
e~tablish foundation,There is no education,and it makes no sense
to him, and to him that is tantemount to asking the jury to come
back with a guilty verdict. DeAngelo goes on to claim"we have no
scientific background that we could establish this" See Trial TR.
Pg.349,350)

On the same pages DrAngelo makes it clear he never spoke
with Shelley or Kelsea. Never asked the court to be allowed an
intrview, and at the April 7th hearing told the court speaking
with Shelley or Kelsea wasn't necessary.See pre trial April7th)
At trial both the prosecuting attorney and Dalrymple's
trial counsel relied upon the same Idaho precident-Statev.Iwakiri,
106 Idaho 618,682 P.2d571(1984)-as providing the legal basis
under Idaho law for determining whether testimonyby a witness should
be admissibleafter having undergone hypnosis which could have
potentially altered memory,or even implanted false mrmories, in
respect to proposed testimony that is to be presented at trial by
that witness. Since Mr.DeAngelo knows of and has read Iwakiri well
enough to rely on the precedents ther, he would also have known
about The Idaho Supreme Court adopting a pre-trial procedure by
which such potentially tainted testimony could be challenged and
tested. Mr.DeAngelo's claim of "no scientific background" must
have been an error. Or a lie.

Pg.6

Even if such testimony were determined to be admissiblr, it
could still be challenged and limited to both weight and credibility
as a result of the hynosis.
Under the Iwakiri decision the question as to whether proposed
testimony to be presented by a witness at trial has been tainted
by hypnosis is a question for the trial court to determine at a
pre-trial hearing. the district court at the post conviction hearing
in this case indicated that this would be the procedure that should
be followed if its decision denying post-conviction relief is
reversed avd the case remanded:
(Tr. pg.29,L. 23 to pg.30 L.6)
If a new trial is ordered in this case,I'm not sure that
necessarily,Ihave to go there in terms of we do have the earlier
precidence cited by both of you from the Supreme Court regarding
testimony that is elicited through hypnotism, but I think that that's
another step in the event that the court were to grant a new trial,
we would probably have a pre-trial hearing in that regard.
:n the course,d7$1//,~~findings of fact at the close of the post-conviction
hearingJudge McGloughlin declared that those facts concerning this
issue of potentially hypnotically-tainted testimony were entirely
absent from this case.(Tr.pg •• 206,L.5 to pg.207,L.8)
There is no evidence before this court from a hypnotist that
this testimony and the incredible suggestion made to a child that
she has been sexually abused, when in fact, she has not been sexually
abused, and for this theory or defense imposed by Mr.Dalrymple,
there's no showing that such a suggestion, hypnotic suggestion is
even possible. Perhaps, it is possible, butI'd have to speculate.
THe burden is upon the petitioner to show that, A, this
hypnosis ocured, perhaps, through having a hypnotist interview the
victim or review their testimony. I would simply have to speculate
as to whether or not an expert in hypnosis couldhave come in and
said, well,this is all, not only possible, but it's highly probable.
I just have nothing.
And again, I I know that both Mr. DaNgelo and frankly,
Mr.Schwartz, you've tried today to do your best to find somebody
that could come in and kind of focus on these issues and structure
them in a way where the court could look at this and say,okay,
well an expert has said he has an opinion that perhaps this childs

Pg.7
te§timony had the kind of syntax and rythm to it that indicates
that she may haue been hypnotized; that this kind of hypnotic
__ suggestion is possible, and could, in fact, have taken place. It's
all speculation.
Although Judge McGloughlin, based upon professional and ethical
concerns had excused Mr. Dalrymple's trial counsel from any obligation
to elicit any testimony concerning the potential effects of
hypnotically-alterd testimony in this case. The district court also
noted that this was one area where the performance of Mr.Dalrymple's
trial council had in fact been deficiant:(Tr.pg. 212, L. 17 to pg.
213, L.6)

based upon those findings :.the~~cc;:nirt~then would conclude that
the totality of the evidence here, that there was no ineffective
.assistance of counsel with that one somewhat minor exception, and
that was whether or not Mr. DeAngelo'had fully and completely
attempted to find an expert on hypnosis.
And when you look at the standard in Strickland,again I
don't want to send the higher court a conflicing ruling on this,
but I think it.:::_ma~_-_be.::that theee could have been possibly a little
more effort in that area. I frankly,cannot find from the totality
of the evidence that that one· issue rose to the level of ineffective
,assistance of counsel.
A substantial portion of the Iwakiri decision is composed
of Justice Bistline's dissenting opinion. 106 Idaho at 627-654,
682 P.2d at 580-607. although not authoritative in respect to new
principles of law, or as the rule of decision announced in that
case, Justice Bistline's citation to additional facts based upon
the record on appeal in that case that were not referanced in the
majorityopinion, and his citation to other persuasive authorities
does provide reliable background information that is relavant to
the determination of the issues raised on this case.
In fact Justice Bistline sets out in his dissenting opinion
a number of extensive quotations from the transcript in that case
that are quite informative as to similar issues that are presented
to this court. For example,one of the defense experts who testified
in the Iwakiri case, Dr.Bishop Basil Rhodes, discussed the use of
"identical phraseology" or "mirrored phrases" as an indicator of
hypnotically-influenced testimony, which may be the source of the
district court'sdecloration in this case concerning the absence of
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any evidence in the record that indicaied

that,"this child's

testimony had the kind of syntax of rythm to it that indicates that
she may have been hypnotized •• " Tr.pg.207 LL.3-5) Of course,the
absence of that evidence is the direct result of the failure of
Mr. dalrymple's trial council to even make an attempt to elicet
that testimonythrough the pre-trial procedure that was outlined by
the majority in the Iwakiri ~decision.
Two very telling issues that were present in this case-the
apparent absence of qualified experts, and the question of
Mr.Oalrymple's qualification as a hypnotist-were also present in
the Iwakiri case.
Mr. Dalrymple's trial council(Mr.DeAngelo) testified at the
post-conviction hearing as to 'his inability in 2004 to obtain any
expert witnesses in hypnosis.(see P.C. Tr.pg.119 L.5 to 18)
Yat almost a quarter of a century earlier,in the early 1980's
the defense in the Iwakiri case,which also was heard and determined
in Boise, was able to procure two expert witnesses: Richard Hannebaum
and Dr. Bishop Basil Rhodes.106 Idaho at 641,682 P.2d at 594. The
testimony of these two defense experts as to potential hazards posed
by hypnoticaly-influenced testimony is extensively set out or
summarized in Justice Bistline'sdissent.106 Idaho at 627,-654,682
P.2d at 580-607) The citation to this expert testimony on the effects
of hypnotism on the reliability of trial testimony was bolstered
by citations to other legal authorities, including questions concerning
the existence of implanted false memories.(106 Idaho at 648-649
P.2d at 106-02)
It is significant to the second issue, as to Mr.Dalrympl~'o
own qualifications as a hypnotist, that in the Iwakiri case the
initial hypnosis session also had been conducted by a seemingly
unqualified individual, a Boise Police Department detective,whose
testimony was objected to at trial "on the grounds that Detective
Anderson was not qualified to conduct the hypnosis session,but
the court allowed his testimony.Rpt.Tr.V.6,p.662-66~ (106 Idaho at
637,682 P.2d at 590. Detective Anderson was cross examined about
his qualifications to conduct the hypnosis session.Rpt Tr.V.6,p.873
et seq~ ID.

Pg.9
The majority opinion in Iwakiri rejected any of the 'per se•
rules formulated by other courts concerning the admissibility of
hypnoticaly-affected testimony and instead adopted a rule for
determining competency based upon an evaluation using six enumerated
safeguards. 106 IDaho at 625,682 P.2d.at 578. The majority further
noted that," It would be an unusual case if all of the mentioned
safeguards were followed~ 106 Idaho at 626, 682 P.2d at 579.
These six safeguards were specifically formulated to address
the question of hypnoticaly-enhanced testimony for the puposes of
prospectively refreshing the recollection of facts by a witness,
which was the question that was presented in the Iwakiri case.
Although a different situation was presented in this case,involving
the question of whether false memories had been previously
hypnoticaly implanted in a witness, both the prsecution and the
defense in this case relied upon the safeguards announced in the
Iwakiri case as establishing the necessary foundational elements
for the addmission of the hypnosis theory that was advanced by
Mr.Dalrymple as the foundation of his defense in the case.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Iwakiri safeguards were
designed to be implemented in respect to the prospective use of
hypnosis,the implimentayion of those safeguards, or similar safeguards
in respect to a witness who is alleged to have been previously
subjected to hypnosis, through a pre-trial procedure was the
significant omission by Mr. Dalrymple's trial counsel that
constitutes the ineffective assistance of counsel that prejudiced
Mr.Dalrymple's case.If in fact his conviction was based upon
testimony concerning acts that never occurred, but instead
was the result of testimony based upon false mamories that
had been hypnoticaly implanted.
THe use of the Iwakiri pre-trial procedure avoids two
problems that prominently prejudiced Mr. Dalrymple's defense in
this case. First, and perhaps most significantly,use of the
pre-trial procedure places the decision concerning the determination
of the competency of witness testimony that is to be presented at
trial in the hands of the court. ~ , u s e of the pre trial
procedure avoids the professional and ethical concerns that arose
during this trial in respect to the presentation of previously
unvetted testimony to a jury,which led the district court to determine
that it had to excuss Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel and coerce
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Mr. Dalrymple into proceeding pro-se in order to present his chosen
defense concerning hypnoticaly influenced testimony to the jury.
Mr.Dalrymple, by his own addmission,only completed his formal
education through the Ninth grade.His knowledge of hypnosis was
largely self taught. And his stated purpose in hypnotically implanting
the false memories in Kelsea appeared to be irrational and selfdestructive.See Trial TR. Idaho v. Dalrymple)
Yet the question that is presented on this appeal ,is not
whether his proposed defense was"stupid" as it was characterized
by his trial counsel, Nor whether in the estimation of Mr.DAngelo
his trial counsel, there was no way that he could establish the
requesit foundation necessary to establish Mr.Dalrymple's chosen
defense.
Instead, the question presented here is whether Mr.Dalrympleor any defendant for that matter-shoul.Dbe accorded thier

fifth,

and fotteenth amendment rights to due process, Shoul they have
access to a full and fair determination of whether the trial testimony
that is presented against them 1 and upon which he could be convicted
and sentenced to life in prison,has been previously hypnotically
tainted from any source? Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel failed to
request the pre-trial procedure for making this determination that
was outlined in Iwakiri. His failure to do so constituted
ineffective assistanse of counsel and prejudiced Mr.Dalrymple'.s
by allowing for his conviction based upon acts that he did oat
commit if the witnesses' testimony that led to his conviction was
based upon hypnotcally implanted false memories.
The 1V84 Iwakiri decision was issued contemporaneously with
the eruption of the McMartin Pre-School scandl in California.
McMartin,and related cases,demonstated how highly susceptible
young children are to suggestion,regardless of whether those
suggestions are made hypnoticaly or by other means through which
a favored answer is indicated. One of the lessons imparted from
that experience is the importence of judicial process in providing
necessary protections against implanted or false testimony both
as protection to those who have genuinely suffered from molestation
and as a protection to those who are falsely accused. The ultimate
question here is not whether Mr.Dalrymple's Proffered hypnotic
defense was actually credible or even self-defeating, But whether
he was afforded a full and fair opotunity to present that defense
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in respect to testimony that was aledged to be hypnotially
implanted or tainted. Based upon the record before this court he
was not,and therefore this conviction should be reversed.

Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel that created the possibility that Mr.Dalrymple was
convicted for acts he didn't commit as a result of his trial counsel's
failure to investigate,and failure to request the pre-trial
procedure for determining if potential trial testimony had been
hypnoticaly tainted and
conviction should be reversed.

,AS a consequence Mr.Dalrymple's
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ISSUE
Mr.Dalrymple was deprived of his right to defend against his
accusers, Present evidence in his favor,Or present a complete
defense.
Mr. Dalrymple was deprived of his right to confront and cross
examine his accusers when the District Court refused to allow him
to recallKelsea after his council was discharged and he was representing
himself. See trial tran. Pg. 388,389,390,391,
JUdge McGloughlin: You may call your next witness•
Dalrymple;"Kelsea Breton"
Ms.Fisher; Kelsea has been released from her subpoena and is ~t
school. She was released yesterday.
McGloughlin; I'm going to sustain. she was released.
After a brief back and forth with the court Dalrymple state he has
other evidence that is not in the courtroom(due to D'Angelo's refusal
to investigate)

The court sends the jury out

then asks Dalrymple

"did you have any additional evidence you wished to present?
I'll let you make an offer of proof,if youlld like, asto what you
believe Kelsea would testify to •• not what she would testify to
what you intend to prove through her,if you would like.
Dalrymple is unsure he attempts to ask the court a question,
eventually Dalrymple says:what I would hope to prove is that we did
the hypnosis._
McGloughlin; anything eles: Dalrymple attempts to answer once again
the court cuts him off and advisess him to "Stick to my question"
11

What eles would you prove by calling Kelsea to the stand?

Dalrymple( By simply calling her to the stand,the only thing that
I could prove is that we actually did the hypnosis; that we actually
did the countdown and that she and I were there and that it did
happen.
McGloughlin/4 All right.And did you have any other evidence •••
Dalrymple(from Ln. 4 Pg.391)

The other evidence is there was a

journal in the garage at the house.There was three tapes, three
cassette tapes in the --tapes in the house, and in the computer
at the house is an on line library that we pay a subscription for.
And in the first two chips of every computer built in 93, it records
~very place it went and everything it saw.And whats on that computer
is from that library is all about the hypnosis.It's just verification
that that's what I was studying.
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Mcgloughlin; Anything eles? Besides Kelsea and the computer/
Dalrymple; Shelley needs to understand •••
Mcgloughlin; Well I'm not here to councel.I just want to know what
other evidence you would bring in? Kelsea,the computer,journals,
and you said tapes. Anything else?
Dalrymple: Idon't know of anything else.
McGloughlin: Okay. Well you've testified as to the computer, the
journals.
Dalrymple: Unless somebody would go get an expert in hypnosis and
we can talk about how this was done and if it was even possible.
McGloughlin: I'm going to find that the evidence has been produced
at this trial.THis case is coming to a close. You've talked about
the computer. You've talked about the journals. You've talked about
the tapes.Kelsea was released as a witness. there was no objection.
And so, this case is going to be brought to a close unless the state
has rebuttal evidence.
Ms. Fisher; No sir.
McGloughlin; Bring in the jury. We're going to closing arguments
after final instructions. Bring in the jury.
This testimony about additional evidence,happens without the
jury present. Not only is Dalrymple deprived of his right to question
Kelsea about hypnosis. He is also deprived of his right to present
evidence that would further exonerate him. Then his testimony
about Kelsea's knowledge, and the existance of physical evidence
is never heard by the jury.
The Compulsory Process Clause of the 6th amendment, grants a
defendant the right to offer theietstimony of favorable witnesses
and to compel their attendance at trial. To exercise the compulsory
process right,a defendant must show that the testimony would be
material and favorable to the defendant, and not merly cumulative.
(Done and Done)
Dalrymple's testimony is that Kelsea will be a witness that can
verify his statements about hypnosis, Dalrymple's testimony about
his journal, cassete tapes, and the computer, was physical evidence
that would prove his account and exonerate him of the molestation
charges.
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,However the right is not absolute and may yield to other
interests.
Dalrymple questions what other interests(if any) were presented in
order to prevent the presentation of his journal, the cassete tapes,
the computer,and, Kelsea's testimony.
Dalrymple questions; If such other interests do exist, why was
there not a hearing to determine the validity of those interests?
A violation of the Compulsory Process Clause is also subject
to harmless error analysis and will contitute harmless error if it
is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not
contribute to the verdict.
The testimony and evidence Dalrymple

was denied would have

quite possibly changed the verdict to not guilty. Therefore had it
not been for the violation of Compulsory Process by Judge McGloughlin
the verdict would have been different. The absence of Exculpatory
evidence that was readily available is testiment to both D'Angelo's
unwillingness,or inability to assist his client, and McGloughlin's
indiferance to a defendants right.
In enacting prcedural rules, a state may not arbitrarily limit
a defendants ability to secure the testimony of witnesses favorable
to them, or arbitrarily limit the evidence a defendant may present.
Dalrymple does not recieve any reason why he is not allowed
to present evidence in his favor, only that Kelsea is not available
at that time. Likewise there is no explination as to why the jury
can't hear the testimony that was just presented to the court by
Dalrymple about the existence of evidence.that could have made a
impact on thier decision. Dalrymple contends; The absence of a
hearing to determlne the admissability of testimony by Kelsea,
and the presentation of physicall evidence, makes the decision by
McGloughlin, to end proceedings without the jury having full
knowledge of the existence of exonerating evidence, Arbitrary.
see Holmes v.

s,c.,

547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) afferming

criminal defendants right to 'meaningfull opportunity to present
a complete defense" ( quoting Crane v. Ky. 476 U.S. 683,690 (1986)
see also Chambers,410 U.S. at 302 Defendants right to fair
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opportunity to present defense, whether rooted in the 14th amendments Due Process Clause or 6th Amendments Confrontation or
Compulsory Process Clause, violated by trial courts exclusion of
competent, reliable evidence bearing on credibility of confession
becouse that evidence was central to defendants claim of innocence.
The evidence and testimony Dalrymple attempted to present at
trial was not irrelevant, and therefore not harmless error by the
court. The evidece and testimony was the"whole defense" against
the allegation of molestation. The jury should therefor been allowed
to hear it.
U.S. v.Arbolez,450,F3d 1283, 1295(11th Cir.2006) ( refusal to allow
defendant to present evidence or argument at forfeiture stage of
trial not harmless because net beyond reasonable doubt evidence
would have persuaded jury)
u.s.v.Safavian,528,F.3d 957,967(D.C. Cir.2008)(erroneous exclusion
of expert witness testimony not harmless error because testimony
context crucial to jury's determination)
u.s.v.Simpson,992F2d 1224,1230(D.C.Cir.1993)(compulsory process
violated when court refused to aid defendant in securing witness
who allegedly would have provided exculpatory testimony)
u.s.v.Turning Bear,357 F.3d 730,735(8th.Cir.2004)(compulsory
process violated when court refused to admit testimony of character
witness becouse credibility central issue of case and court failed
to cite any interest that outweighed probative value of testimony)
Dalrymple's conviction should be overturned,the sentence vacated,
and remanded.
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ISSUE.
Involuntary and
Untimley Waiver to Proceed Pro Se
In Faretta v.California,theSuprem Court held that an acussed
has a sixth amendment right to conduct his or her own defen1e in
a criminal case.The accused must have the ability to conduct the
organization and content of his defense. Thr defendants request to
proceed prose should be timely.And a defendant must knowingly &
intelligently waive the right to counsel.Further the request needs
to be voluntary.
In the case of Dalrymple v.State of Idaho,I'll begin by stating
Dalrymple never makes a request to proceed prose. In reviewing
the trial transcript,or the previous hearings transcript there is
nothing to indicate Dalrymple ever made such a request.In fact
every time the subject is broached it is Judge McGloughlin who
makes the suggestion. (see trial transcript pg.354,355)&(pretraial
April 7th 2004) This fact brings into question the voluntariness
of Dalrymple's decision to fire his attorney.At trial Dalrymple
wants the court to understand that his attorney,(Mr.Dangelo)has
not brought forth important evidence.Mr. Dangelo cnfirms and further
informes the court he also hasen't investigated Mr.Dalrymple's
defense becouse he doesn't understand. Judge McGloughlin's reply
to this is to deliver to Dalrymple an ultimatem,(tr. tran.pg.348,
to 355)Mr.Dalrymple,obviously,there are new issues that have come
uphere before the court.let me lay out for you how i'm inclined
to proceed.If you wish to reopen this case and put on testimony
that you've said you wish to present,thats fine,You can do that
You will be representing yourself ••••• Dalrymple clearly does not
make a request to be pro se,Judge McGloughlin tells him he will
be. It's obvious Dalrymple would not have chosen a prose defense
had he not been backed into a corner by the court.Also Judge
McGloughlin should have known that a choice between poor representation
by unprepaired counsel & self representation,makes a waiver
Involutary. see(Patterson,487 U.S. 292n.4)(waiver must be voluntary)
If the defendent must choose between the right to self representationand poor council,the choice of the former may be
considered involuntary.
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See,e.g.,Pazden v.Maurer424 F.3d303,316,318(3d Cir.2005)
(involintary waiver when defendant given choice between unprepaired
council and self representation)
James v.Brigano,470 F.3d 634,644(6th Cir.2006)(involutary waiver
when defendant given choice between poor council and self representation)~Plumlee v.DelPapa,465 F.3d910,920-22(9th Cir.2006)same;
U.S. v.Silkwood,893F.2d245,248-49(10th Cir.1989)(involuntary
waiver when trial court impermissiblytforc~d defendant to choose
between self-representation and poor counsel.
Dalrymple was not asking to be prp se he was stating his
frustratin about DAngelo's performance. Self representation
was the courts solution to DAngelo's inept performance. The
ultimatum delivered by the court in this case was untimely at
the very least and only served to prejudice an already precarious
defense.
During the trial is not a good time to change council,
I shuldn't need to say more than that.The reason for such a choice
by Judge McGloughlin is unclear but a fair trial and presentation
ef all the evidence was not a factor.
What Mr.McGloughlin sucseeded in doing was make an already
unprepaired defense apear even more unprepaired.
The choice to procede prose was untimely and prejudical towords
the defense. Trial court must balance prejuidce to defendant
that would result if motion to proceed prose denied with
disruption to proceedings that woul result if motion granted.
See,e,g.,U.S.Matsushita,794,F.2d46,51(2d Cir.1986)
u.s.v.Majors,328 F.3d791,794( 5th Cir.2003)(defendants request
to proceed prose properly denied as untimely becouse made on
second day of trial);U.S.v.Edelman,458 F.3d 791,808-09(8th Cir.2006)
(defendants request to proceed prose properly denied as untimely
because made 5 days before trial and after several continuances)
u.s.v.McKenna,327 F3d830,844(9th Cir.2003)(defendants request to
proceed prose denied as untimelybecause motion brought in
opening brief but not rease4rted until after case went to jury)
u.s.v.Smith,413 F.3d1253,1281(10th Cir.2005)(defendants request
to proceed prose properly denied as untimely because request
made 6 days before trial);U.S.v.young,287 F3d 1352,1354(11th Cir2002)
(defendants request to proceed prose properly denied as untimely
because made after jury impaneled)
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Dalrymple's decision to be prose was forced on him by the
court and is therefore involuntary. The ultimatum presented
by the court is untimely and violates Dalrymple's 6th Amendment
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions.
Dalrymple lacked the ability to conduct the organization
and content of his defense.
Dalrymple's attorny Mr. DAngelo,had not made a investigation
into Dalrymple's hypnosis defense. Mr.DAngelo refused to interview
the prosecution witness,never contacted an expert in hypnosis to
interview his client,never requested a pre-trial proceedure to
determin the existence of hypnotic suggestion and it's effect on·
Kelsea's testimony.Mr.DAngelo claimed to the court that he could
not establish a foundation for a hypnosis defense when in fact he
hadn't taken the nessisary steps to do so.He further crippled
Dalrymple's defese by refuesing to interview Kelsea about hypnosis
during cross examination and then releasing her from her subpoena
against the wishes of his client.
When Dalrymple attempted to conduct a defense there was no~content
to organize, Mr.McGloughlin, while he was eager to put forth the
ultimatem that coerced Dalrymple to represent himself,never suggested
a recess in order to prepair. Mr.DAngelo who was now stand
by counsil, never suggested a recess,and Dalrymple didn't know
enough to request time to prepair.see tr. tran.349,thru 356)
Mr.Dalrymple's supposed waiver was not voluntary,
it was untimley,and it lacked orginization and content.
I could attempt to debate whether Dalrymple's waiver was
knowing and intelligent, however that question has been raised
and answered by eaqually ineffitiant council. It should be
pointed out however that to change council during a trial is never
wise. So safe to say the choice was not intelligent.
see Plumlee v. DelPapa,465 F.3d 910,920-22( 9th Cir. 2006)
Plumlee asserted that his lawyer had betrayed him where members
of the public oefenders office were leaking information about his
case to another suspect and to the District Attorney. The lack of
trust on both sides were so severe that Plumlee's attorney not
only corroborated Plumlee's claim that the relationship had broken
down,but even made his own motion to be relieved. The District
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Court denied the motion. Plumlee then chose self-representation
because of the irreconcilable conflict with his attorney. An
erroneous denial of a motion to substitute counsel that prompts a
defendant to choose self-representations warrants reversal despite
the defendant's "choice" to represent himself.
Like Plumlee, Dalrymple had also asserted his counsel was
leaking information to the Prosecutors office.and that the lack of
trust and communication had never really existed. Dalrymple had
likewise made motions to the court asking that D'Angelo be replaced.
Once on 02/19/2004 and again on 04/07/2004, In fact communicatin
was so poor at the 02/19/04 hearing that Dalrymple and D'Angelo
were sent out of the courtroom to"settle thier differenses" as a
result of an argument they were having at the defense table.
AT the april 7th hearing Dalrymple has filed a motion once
again to disqualify D'Angelo as his counsel and asking for the court's
assistance to depose State Witness Shelley Breton. McGloughtin
informes Dalrymple of his Faretta warnings and gives him the choice
of D'Angelo as counsel or none at all. Dalrymple states "I need
an attorney~' Mcgloughlin then questions D 'Angelo about deposing
Shelley and D'Angelo says" that wont be Nessasary'':
While D'Angelo doesn't make any motion to be relieved,he does
reveal to the Court during Trial that he doesn't understand Dalrymple's
defense, and i t " makes no sence to him", and that he hasen't
spoken with Shelley Or Kelsea about hypnosis, or made contact with
any proffesionals in the field of hypnosis. see TRial TRan. pg.349
thru 352. Like PLumlee, D'Angelo corroborates Dalrymple's claims
about his performance, D'Angelo will ultimatly claim a "conflict"
existed that prevented him from properly representing Dalrymple.
McGlouqhlin errored when he denied the motion for substitute
counsel,and he again errored at trial when he forced Dalrymple to
choose between D'Angelo~s representation or proceeding Pro-se.
D'Angelo's representation amounted to no representation at all
thereby rendering DALRYMPLE"S

"choice" Involuntary.

An involuntary waiver requiers reversal and Dalrymplets conviction
should be overturned, The sentences vacated, and the case remanded
in full back to the Disrict Court.
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ISSUE.
Ineffective Assistance of Council

Due To
Conflict of Interest.
Barron's Law Dictionary defines Conflict of Interest as, A
situation in which regard for one duty leads to disregard for another.
463,F.2d 600,602, or might reasonably be expected to do so.
IN all cases,once an actual conflict exists,the attorney must
withdraw and new counsel must be engaged to represent each party.
To obtain a reversal of a conviction,the defendant must prove
that(1) counsel's performance"fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and(2)counsel's deficient performance prejudiced
the defendant,resulting in an unrelieable or fundamentally unfair
outcome in the proceeding. A defendants failure to satisfy one
prong of the test negates a courts need to consider the other.
However, In interpreting the prejudice prong, the Supreme Court
has identified a narrow category of cases in which prejudice is
pre.sumed: when there has been an"actual or constructive denial
of the assistance of counsel altogether: "various kinds of State
interference with counsels performance~ or when counsel is burdened
by an actual conflict of interest.
Dalrymple's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded.
The first time MR.DeAngelo's "conflict" is brought to light is by
the trial judge,Mr. McGloughlin,see(trial tr. pg.395 Ln.2)
Mr.DeAngelo had adequetly shown to the court that there was a conflict
on this issue and that pursuent to the canons of ethics, for him
to go forward with such evidence,you could concevably be violating
those canons.And so, that was the baises of the court allowing
Mr.Dalrymple to proceed to represent himself.
This declaration was stated after the jury had gone to
deliberate. The exact nature of Mr.DeAngelo's ~onflictdis never
disclosed. We don't have the benifit of knowing why Mr.DeAngelo
thought he might violate his ethics. Or how he could possibly have
reached

such an impasse without a proper investigation. Dalrymple

questions how the court could consider DeAngelo's performance
"adequet" knowing he hadn't spoken to any wittness or secured any
expert testimoney, and he failed to ask for any kind of pre trial
procedure to determine the existence of hypnosis. (see trial tr.
pg 350)
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Dalrymple questions why Mr.DeAngelo didn't withdraw, and allow
new counsel to be appointed? Mr.DeAngelo knew of Dalrymple's
desire to present hypnosis as a baises for his defense long before
the trial or the april 7th hearing. Mr.DeAngelo could have and
should have withdrawn as Dalrymple's council.
Whatever DeAngelo's reason for stating a conflict,he2sbould
not have been allowed to prejudice Dalrymple's defense.
Dalrymple asserts DeAngelo's performance and his conflict of interest
justifies presumed prejudice and conviction should be reversed
and the case remanded.
STANDARDS for CONFLICT of INTEREST CLAIMS.
Mickens

v.

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,171, 152 L.Ed.2d 291

(2002)

( an "actual conflict" is a" conflict that affected counsel's
performance--as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.
Amiel v. U.S. 209 F.3d 195, 199 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(" To show a lapse in representation, a defendant need not demonstrate
prejudice--that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for the conflict--but only that some plausible
alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but
was not and that the alternative defense was inherently ifi conflict
with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or
intere~t's").
In Dalrymple's case there is a factual showing of inconsistent
interests and demonstrates that D'Angelo made a choice between
possible alternative courses of action, and he failed to elicit
evidence helpfull to his client. It's not clear how McGloughlin
can justify appointing D'Angelo standby counsel after he has declared
a conflict, and after the interview about his failings in gathering
evidence. At this point McGloughlin Knows D'Angelo is unwilling to
assist Dalrymple in presenting his defense so unless the court's
intent is to further cripple Dalrymple's defense, why leave him as
counsel in any capacity at all?
u.s.v.Moore, F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998)
conflict where client made repeated representations to the court
regarding his inability to communicate with attorney).
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CONSTRUCTIVE DENIAL of COUNSEL.
Dalrymple's defense councel's performance was not only
inefective,but D'Angelo abandoned the required duty of loyalty to
his client; D'Angelo did not simply make poor strategic or tactical
choices; he acted with reckless dissregard for his client's best
interest and, apparently, with the intention to weaken his client's
case.
Bell v. cone, 535 u.s. 685,152 L.Ed.2d

914,122 s.ct.1843,

1850 ( 20021
CRONIC applies when counsel entirly fails to subject the
prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial testing process.
The Bell Court clarified that an attorney's failure must be complete,
noting the difference between the situations addressed by Strickland
and Cronic is

II

not of degree but of kind

II

Bell 122 s.ct. at 1581.

The court identified three situations implicating the right to
counsel, where the Court would presume petitioner has been prjudiced.
First: where petitioner is denied counsel at a critical stage of
the criminal proceeding. Second; where petitioner is represented
by counsel at trial, but counsel'' entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to a meaningfull adversarial testing~ Third;
prejudice is presumed when the circumstances surrounding a trial
prevent petitioers attorney from rendering effective assistance
of counsel.
In the case of State of Idaho v. David Dalrymple, see trial
tr. Pg. 354 Ln. 20. In satisffying the first situation in Cronic
the Court (Judge McGloughlin) states; Mr. Dalrymple, obviously,
there are new issues that have come up here before the court. Let
me lay out for you how I'm inclined to prceed. If you wish to
reopen this case and to put on the testimony that you've said you
wish to present, tha's fine, You can do that. You will be representig
,yourself because if tou contiue to have Mr. D'Angelo represent you
this case is closed.
If you choose to fire him as your counsel and you want to
proceed on your own--and that means also not only do you take the
witqess stand and testify, you are subject to recross-examination,
1

and as far as any closing arguments are concerned, you will be
makeing those to the jury.
The ability to gather, orginize, and present evidence, is
the responsibility of the defense counsel. -
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Dalrymple knows, and the Court has been made aware that D'Angelo
has not conducted an investigation) see trial tr. Pg.349, 350.
Dalrymple also refusses to abandon his only defense to the allegation
of molestation against him. Dalrymple tells the court; This needs
told, Your Honor. I think I'll represent myself.
This qualifies as a CRITICAL STAGE of the PROCEEDINGS,
In fact a reasonable person(whether qualified in law or not) would
probably consider the entire trial, from start to completion,
a CRITICAL STAGE, and the decision, that somehow an untrained
defendant is suddenly qualified midtrial to represent himself is
unreasonable.
AS to the SECOND SITUATION presented in Cronic, D'Angelo
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningfull
adversarial testing, During cross examination, see trial tr.
Pgs. 131, thru. 150. D'Angelo fails to ask Kelsea anything about
hypnosis. D'Angelo failed to gather evidence and present that
evidence at trial, see trial tran. Pg. 349,thru 353. regarding
hypnosis, failed to request a pre-trial proceedure that would
have possibly identified hypnotic suggestion, failed to gather
physical evidence, journal, cassettes, and computer. D'Angelo
failed to petition the court requesting an interview with the
prosecution's witnesses,()A witness has rights and can deniy an
interview by a defendant or defendant's councel providing those
rights are not in conflict with a defendant's 14th amendment
rights.) D'Angelo doesn't ask for a hearing to determine rights
and at a april 7th pre-trial hearing, tells the court" he sees
no need to speak with them"

When the court is made aware of

D'Angelo's negligence and questions him, D'Angelo claims he doesn't
understand Dalrymple's defense, and then somehow claims he has a
conflict.( The record does not indicate when D'Angelo makes the
conflict claim) The first mention of conflict is by Judge McGloughlin
§ee trial tr. Pg. 395, Ln. 2 thru 6;
D'Angelo's performance,or, lack of performance ,should be enough
to convince this court of the possibility Dalrymple didn't commit
the offenses for which he is incarcerated.
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 152 L.Ed.2d 291(2002)
( prejudice presumed where counsel was

II

denied entirely or during

a critical state of the proceeding")
Daniels v. Woodford,428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005)

Pg.24
INCOMPETENT to ~TAND TRIAL.
Dalrymple may not have been competant to stand trial due to
8motional Problems.
D'Angelo failed to investigate Dalrymple's Mental,or emotional
condition, Where it was apparent from conversations with Dalrymple
that his inability to communicate properly, and constant crying
were symptoms of some type of dissorder.
Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp. 2d 979(C.D. Cal. 1998)
Evidentiary hearing was warrented where an issue of fact
existed whether the defendant was competent to stand trial and
whether counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigatigg
evidence.
Correll v Stewart, 137F.3d 1404, ( 9th Cir. 1998 )
Trial counsels failure to present any evidence of petitioners
mental illness which may have constitute mitigating circumstances
requiered an evidentiary hearing to resolve ineffectivness of
counsel claim.
U.S. v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915 ( 9th Cir. 1989 )
Trial counsels failure to investigate defendants mental state
and present evidence, at trial based on defendants mental state
constituted a significant claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
and requiered the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003 )
(" a failure to timely investigate a cliemts mental state,let alone
I

a failure to assert a mental state defense at trial,falls well
below an objective standard of reasonableness"where a defendant
exibits

II

severe mental problems")

Evans v. Lewis, 855F.2d 631,636-39 ( 9th Cir. 1988 )
( counsel's failure to pursue the possibility of establishing the
defendant's mental instability constituted ineffective assistance.)
Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1159-60(9th Cir.1989)
(" counsel made no tactical decision not to investigate[the defendant's]
possible mental impairment; he simply failed to do so")
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COUNSEL'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS
Cumulative errors, while some are individually harmless, when
considered together, can prejudice a defendant as much as a single
reversible error and violate a defendant's right to due process of
law. The cumulative affect of D'Angelo's errors to wit; Failed to
investigate,(2) Failed to order pre-trial procedure for the determination of hypnosis.(3) Failed to properly dissqualify witness
with prior statements.(4) Failed to object to prosocuter's coaching
of witness.(5) Failed to cross examine witness about hypnosis.(6)
{6) Failed to contact an expert in hypnosis to interview his client.
(7) Failed to contact a mental health profesional when it was
apparent his client was emotionaly unstable to the point it affected
his ability to cornrnunicate.(8) As standby counsel he failed to
request a mistrial.(9) Failed to request time for his client to
prepair.(10) Failed to gather evidence favorable to his clients
defense.(11) Failed to withdraw when he had a conflict.(12) And
Failed to understand his client's case.
All constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
u.s.v. Troy, F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995)
The Ninth Circuit found the cumulative effect of the errors deprived
the defendant of a fair trial. This case was not a ineffective
assistance of counsel claim; rather, the trial court's action
hindered the defendant's case.
Wade v. Calderon,29 F.3d 1312 (9th CIR, 1994)
Defense counsel's cumulative errors and omissions during penalty
phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Thomas v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1995)
Counsel's cumulative errors in failing to investigate and impeach
the jailhouse informants and to rebut the forensic evidence of
rape cast grave doubt on hi reliability of the entire proceedings
thus, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.SEE ALSOU.S. v.Kladouris, 739 F.Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Halton v.Hesson,
803 F.Supp. 1272(M.D.Tenn1992);U.s.v.Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597(O.C.CIR.1970)
Hollines v. Estelle, 569 F.Supp.146(W.D.Tex.1983);Jemison v. Foltz,
672 F.Supp.1002(E.D.Mich.1987); Henry v. Scully, 78 F.3d 51(2nd Cir.1996)
Harris by and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d1432 (9th Cir.1995)
Harris v. Housewright,697 F.2d 202(8th Cir.1982); Harris v. Towe~s,
405 F.Supp. 497(D.Del.1974);Nealy v.Cabana,764 F.2d 1173(5th Cir.1985)
D'Angelo's failure to lay proper foundation for the admission
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of hypnosis evidence, along with his unwillinigness to develope
any semblance of a defense theory constitutes Ineffective assistance
of Coynsel.and deprived Dalrymple of a fair trial.
The allegations presented here are easily provable with a ~@t~~w
of the record,TRial tran. Pg.349 thru 353, D'Angelo addmitts to
the allegations about failing to investigate and failing to develop
foundation. and Trial TRan. Pg. 131 thru 156; During the cross
examination of Kelsea he fails to ask about hypnosis, and at the
conclusion of his interview he releases her from her subpoena
against his client's wishes. He not only fails to ask Kelsea about
hypnosis, he manages to fix it so nobody can interview her about
hypnosis.
D'Angelo's performance was so poor ,[whether intentional or
if he really is that poor an attorney] that he did a better job
for the prosecution's case than his client's. D'Angelo's Cumulative
Errors lay doubt on the conviction, and expose the possibility
Dalrymple was convicted for acts he did not commit •
.cdr 0Dalry1nplu' s conviction shold be overturned.
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ABUSE of DISCCRETION.
Dalrymple alledges the court ( Judge McGloughlin) did abuse
his discretion in COERCING Dalrymple to proceed Pr0-Se after
Dalrymple's counsel (D'Angelo) had claimed a conflict.
The record does not indicate exactly when D'Angelo claims he
has a conflict. The first time conflict is mentioned is by Judge
McGloughlin, see TRial TR. PG. 394 thru 395.; "Now the court today
released counsel based upon this evidence that Mr. Dalrymple
submitted to the jury regarding hypnotism of the child. The baises
for the court's decision in that regard is that Mr. D'Angelo had
adequatley shown to the court that there was a conflict on this
issue and that pursuant to the canons of ethics, for him to go
forward with such evidence, you could conceivably be violating,
those canons. And so, that was the basis of the court allowing
Mr.Dalrymple to proceed to represent himself with the assistance
of counsel,( D'Angelo couldn't properly prepare for trial yet
somehow he is qualified to be standby counsel) Mr. D'Angeloc
present, and he has been throught the course of the trial.
(Dalrymple had asked the court to replace D'Angelo on at least
two seperate hearings prior to trial becouse he feared D'Angelo
would do exactly what he did. Judge McGloughlin had refused.
Now during trial he makes Dalrymple disscharge his attorney if
he wants to present evidence in his defense.)
ON page 354 of trial trans. Ln. 16; the court takes a recess
This is after Dalrymple has told the court about hypnosis and
that D'Angelq was supposed to have assisted him in it's presentation.
The court has questioned D'Angelo about" was he advised of this
hypnotism in advance of trial"

and" did he inquire of the witnesses

in this case, Kelsea or her mother, as to whether or not this had
ever occurred~·
Dalrymple concludes that since D'Angelo makes no declaration
about conflict before this recess, and since McGloughlin makes him
choose between representation and evidence directly after the recess,
D'Angelo must have made this revelation known to the court during
the recess.
Judge McGloughlin makes a poor choice in contiuing the trial.
Whether intentionaly, or, by accident, he forces a choice on the
defenant which would not have happened had he listened during pre-trial
hearings; see pre-trial April 7th.
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Dalrymple should have been appointed different counsel.
Instead McGloughlin creates a further conflict by allowing D'Angelo
to contradict Dalrymple and undermine his veracitY.c which left
Dalrymple without counsel. McGloughlin abused his discretion in
failing to apoint new counsell, Failing to declare a Misstrial, or
at the very least, Failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
In allowing D'Angelo to remain as standby counsel McGloughlin
creats a charade so later he can claim Dalrymple was never denied
counsel at a critical stage, when in fact he was. And again whether
by intent or accident, McGloughlin has created,and presents, to the
jury, a picture of instability in the defense. Further prejudicing
Dalrym~le's defense.
Dalrymple was deprived of DUE PROCESS by the court and
Dalrymple shouldhave been appointed different counsel.
McGloughlin abused his discretion in insissting Dalrymple continue
whenhe knew D'Angelo had not prepaired for trial, hadn't gathered
any evidence, so nothing would be available to present except
Dalrymple's claim without any phisical evidence to substatiate his
claims. Judge McGloughlin's actions are sufficiant to justify
a finding of PRESUMED PREJUDICE and this conviction should be
overturned the sentence vacated, and this case remanded in it's
entierty •
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON POST CONVICTION.
Dalrymple was represented by Cristopher Scwartz at the July 20
and August 11,2009 Post Conviction hearing that resulted in a
confermation of Dalrymple's previous convictions.
Mr. Scwartz failed to bring all the issues to the courts
attention and failrd to bring evidence to support the issue he did
bring. see post con. tr. pg.197 thnu 214. Judge McGloughlin's
assesment of the case.
Throughout McGloughlin's conclusory remarks he contiually makes
mention of Schwartz'es failure to present any evidence to substatiate
Dalrymple's case,And as a Direct Result McGloughlin Denies the
Petition for Post-Conviction.
At the time of Dalrymple's Post-Conviction hearing the case
of Martinez v.Ryan had not yet been decided. This is significant
becouse at the time a Defendant was precluded from Declareing
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claims against thier Post-Conviction
counsel. This situation has .ghanged.
Schwartz and McGloughlin's actions and statements seem to
reflect an attitude of indifference to the testimony presented as
McGloughlin happily points out Schwartz'es inefficiencies in order
to clear himself and D Angelo of any wrongdoing and justify denial
of Dalrymple's Post-Conviction.
At the time McGloughlin, Schwartz, D Angelo and even the
Prosecutor Ms.Fisher are confident there can be no recourse.
This allows them to say and do whatever they want as long as
Dalrymple remains convicted.

Pg~30
GUILTY AT ANY COST.
KANGAROO COURT.
Barrens Law Dictionary defines Kangaroo Court as a court that
has no legal authority, and that disregards all the rights normally
afforded to persons; it's conclusions are not legaly binding.
This is a colloquial term refering to a court that is biased
against a party and thus renders an unfair verdict,or judgment.
The trial c~urt,(Judge McGloughlin.specificaly) did engage in
conduct and desisions which undermined the principles of justice
and undermined Dalrymple's ability to have a fair Hearing either
Trial,or on Post Conviction.
Dalrymple's counsel at both hearings failed to bring and present
evidence in support of Dalrymple's defense,(but it wouldn't have
mattered) Cristopher Schwartz (counsel at Post- Conviction) failed
to present issues available to him in the trial and pre- trial record.
D'Angelo's performance at trial was clearly defitiant. Yet
McGloughlin somehow manages to claim Dalrymple was "adequetly"
represented.
Judge McGloughlin's performance at the conclusion of PostConviction proceedings should stand as a beacon for any Jurist
wishing to Ignore DUE PROCESS and Embrace the GUILTY
philosophy.

AT ANY COST

see Post Conviction tran. pg.197 thru 214.

McGloughlin begins by quoting the standard for Strickland he
even spells S-T-R-C-K-L-A-N-D for those of us who happen to be
illiterate.(condesending) He explains the standard but{coincidentaly)
leaves out the exception- That the Supreme Court has identified a
narrow catagory of cases in which Prejudice is Presumed. When there
has been an Actual or Constructive Denial of the assistance of
Counsel altogether. When counsel is burdened by an Actual

Conflict

Of Interest,or when there are Various kinds of State Interferance.
In these situations Prejudice is so likly to occure that a case by
case inquery is unnecesary.(McGloughlin doesnt want to make the
remotest suggestion that Dalrymple may be correct so he'll just
pick the parts that give his agenda the edge.
I'm going to paraphrase and condence Judge McGloughlin's speach
selecting segments that hopefully retain for the reader,the essance
of his attitude towards thed~:=<!e~ridant and the defendant's rights•
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on pg.197 ln. 20 Mcglaughlin continues "ther's also the
presumption that counsel's performance is within a WIDE RANGE of
Proffesional Assistance,That it is SOUND TRIAL STRATIGY and he quotes
Davis v.state. /.s1t.1:. flt;S-r't1.01t11'&"e-r:row fh.J'l'f t.;t/. it. f"t1fl.,; {.)Gr 1«&,
~/£., AL5 C1
-r'Rrtil .,-ejJ,.I!, ~ (,'"a,. 31/<c .,-/.f{lv ~55
( D'angelo has testified that he failed to understand Dalrymple's
defense and failed to gather evidence, Failed to cross examine
witnesses about hypnosis,Failed to assist his client in presenting
hi defence, and claimed a CONFLICT existed that hindered his
performance at trial) The range of PROFFESIONAL ASSISTANCE must be
really wide for McGloughlin's way of interpretation. Any reasonable
person would have thought that with D'Angelo's addmission of all
those facts the concesus would have gone from effective assistance
to ineffective assistance in record time. But not McGloughlin.
On pg.198 McGloughlin states; "And I can't find from the record
that there was aconflict between Mr.D'Angelo and Mr.Dalrymple(your
joking right?) as to,whether you want to refer to it as a personality
CONFLICT,(now he's going to contradict himself) A conflict that"s
so impacted the attorney- client relationship, That it prevented
.Mr.D'Angelo fromrepresenting Mr. Dalrymple zealously and prudently
and proffesionaly in the course of thier relationship.(What record
is this guy reading from-D'Angelo's testimony was that Dalrymple's
defense was"STUPID"and he [D'Angelo] didn't "UNDERSTAND" and that
Dalrymple was "DIFFICULT" to DEAL WITH" therby creating a situation
which compelled him to claim "CONFLICT" at Dalrymple's trial.
McGloughlin presided over the February 2004 hearing to disqualify
D'Angelo where the argument at the defense table prompted him to
send both D'Angelo and Dalrymple out of the courtroom to"settle
thier differences". Dalrymple asked the court again for a change
of counsel at an April 7th pre-trial hearing; Yet from the record
McGloughlin can't find a conflict that impacted attorney/client
relationshipl, (Does McGloughlin know what CONFLICT means)
on pg.198 ln. 20-McGloughlin continues- There was clearly a
CONFLICT as to this issue of what evidence would be presented and
what evidence wouldn't( Ok LETS THINK- SHOULD A DEFENDANT BE
ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS EXPLANATION OF EVENTS OR, SHOULD HIS ATTORNEY
MAKE THEM UP FOR HIM?) But ,Mcglaughlin says, I can't find that
that so permeated this attorney/client relationship that Mr.D Angelo
did not completly and diligently represent Mr. Dalrymple.
On pages 199 and 200 McGloughlin rambles on about D angelo's
review of the prosecution evidence and the presentation of said
.- .... .:.,:a __

~
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and how that was not ineffective.
On pg.200 ln.25 thru pg.201
I'm satisfied from the totality of the evidence Mr.Dangelo,
over a series of meetings,becouse there was some contention. It
Wasn't about accusatory remarks by Mr.D Angelo.A CLSSIC CONFLICT
would be,This is an offer you got to take,and it's a waste of time
to go to trial.( Once again McGloughlin wants to discuss the CONFFLICT
that he can't find from the record. Only now he wants to differentiate
between CLASIC CONFLICT and what? regular old run of the mill
conflict.Well at least we now know it existes.)
McGloughlin again; pg,201 ln.6
No,this is one where it was permeated with this whole issue
of a meeting between a victim,or at least a parent of a victim,and
a prosecutor and a defense attorney. And that was first and formost
on his mind,and I understand he had a belief that if he ••• and if
that meeting occured there would be this revelation about being
hypnotized and that there would be a recanting of earlier testimony,
(McGloughlin says this like it's the first time HE's heard it)
But I can't find that Mr.D Angelo to have not made a formal! motion
that that was ineffective assistance of counsel.(There's news)
ln.18- Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was,(OK LET'S
ASSUME IT WAS INEFFECTIVE) Ther's been certainly no showing here
that such a meeting would have changed the outcome of the case.To
my knowledge,There's no evidence before this court about any
recantation by the victimin the case.(THAT"S EXACTLY THE POINT
DALRYMPLE HAS TRIED TO MAKE) And on a related note, There is no
testimony before this court of an expert nature as to the issue of
hypnosis.(That was one of Dalrymple's claims,that Dangelo had
failed to bring any expert tetimony. Now McGloughlin points out
that Dalrymple's current councel [Schwartz] is also negligent in
the same area)
pg.202 ln.2

But I'll find that Mr.D Angelo over a period of

time did advise the defendant of his constitutional rights. I know
that the courts precluded from probably looking at the court record,
but the court also advised the defendant of his constitutional
rights,but I'm satisfied that Mr.D Angelo did that and made it clear
to Mr Dalrymple that he could testify,and that he could confront
his accusers and testify on his own behalf,and that,in fact,did
occur.

(Dalrymple's testimony after D Angelo claimed conflict and

he took the stand was without benifit of counsel to present issues,
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and it was hindered by prosecuter and McGloughlin's interference.
When Dalrymple tried to recall Kelsea for testimpny about hypnosis
he was denied.(Apparently someone should explain defendant"rights"
to McGloughlin)
on line 12 McGloughlin;with allegation 6 •• "failure to interview
witnesses,discuss presentation of my defense.Mr.D Angelo never
interviewed the witnesses and was unable to perform any investigation
into the allegations~
Well I'll note for the record that on reviewthat he certainly
called the witnesses that he had been asked to call.The second prong
of Strickland is,okay,who were the witnesses that weren't interviewed
and what would they have testified

that would have changed the

outcome of the case. (McGloughlin has heard testimony from D Angelo
about how he didn't interview Shelley or Kelsea and wouldn't ask
any questions about hypnosis when they testified,D Angelo told
~hat Dalrymple had asked him to file motions and try to set up an
interview with Shelley so that testimony could be brought to trial,
and he [D Angelo] had refused.D Angelo also testified Dalrymple had
wanted him to contact a expert in hypnosis to interview with and
substantiate his testimony.Which again D Angelo failed at.McGloughlin
has heard sworn testimony from D Angeol and Dalrymple and he himself
has just stated "and I understand he had a belief that if this
meeting occured there would be this ·revelation about being hypnotized
and that there would be a recanting of earlier testimony,JYet his

-

[McGloughlin's] next statement is •• Ther's been no proper evidence
to the court who those specific witnesses were
any
_, and,what,if
...__

_______

----

evidence they would have gresented that would have potentially
ehanged the outcome in this case. (More Contradiction)
pg.203 ln.4

Mr.D Angelo did have investigators,assigned

investigators.!'M NOT SAYING THAT THEY INTERVIEWED EVERY WITNESS,
BUT I HAVE YET TO HEAR A SPECIFIC NAME OF A WITNESS THAT WAS ASKED
BY MR.DALRYMPLE TO BE INTERVIEWED AND WHAT THAT WITNESS WOULD HAVE
SAID THAT WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.( The ability
to ignore testimony must be a prerequiset to being a judge)
pg.203 ln.11

McGloughlin then goes to talk about the

deposition issues •• Was it ineffective of Mr.D Angelo to pursue a
motion,(to not pursue is what he should have said) Well you look
at the rule,The rulr 15 of the criminal rules, You can take a
deposition of a witness if they're going to be unavailable to
testify at trial or prevented from attending a trial,Or that the
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testimony of the witness is Material and that i t is necessary to
take the deposition of the witness in order to prevent a failure
of justice. (That's exactly what Dalrymple was trying to prevent,
A Failure of Justice)(McGloughlin throughout his speach inadvertaantly
makes the case for ineffective assistance at the first collateral
proceeding.But since the Martinez V.Ryan case hasen't been heard
yet, he obviously belives he can lay one attorney's misconduct off
on the other and continue on ignoreing the facts.)
pg.203 ln.21 •• Well,okay,ther's been no showing made here by
Mr.Dalrymple how a deposition would have changed the outcome of
the case,(And the aword for ineffective assistance at a collateral
proceeding goes to Mr.Schwartz who advised Dalrymple he wouldn't
need to show that)(Honestly I wish attorneys would wear a sign
stating thier a sellout)
(McGloughlin is once again avoiding the facts,or twisting them.
He's been told by Dalrymple and Dalrymple's counsel how a deposition
would have changed the outcome of the case.)ln23 •• and there's
certainly been no showing here that Mr.D Angelo in declining to
take that invitation by Mr.Dalrymple,that he was ineffective in
his assistance to Mr.Dalrymple in his defense.(Dalrymple never
invited D Angelo to anything,He told him he wanted him [D Angelo]
to do his job.)(It doesn't matter what evidence is brought or
what Dalrymple says,McGloughlin and D Angelo seem to have a you
tell the lie and i ' l l swear to it agreement that can't be overcome
through testimony)
pg.204 ln.11 •• Well first of all,Mr.Dalrymple did get to testify
as to what he did.(McGloughlin knows better,he made the rulings
that prevented testimony) •• Mr.D angelo articulated four resons why
he did not pursue this hypnosis testimony.(Now D Angelo's excuses
will be accepted like he is an aµthority on hypnosis) He outlined
those,and I think that those were very valid reasons why he was
concerned,and it created an ethical dilema for him in that,Even
assuming if he'd asked about how he performed the hypnosis, It
would have still required testimony from the defendant as to whether
or not this person was in a hypnotic state(what?) and I would submit
that does require some expertise. ln.22 •• And,secondly,there was
grave inconsisticies between when this hypnosis alledgedly occured,
and we come back even earlier to where the victim had talked about
earlier, lQwcf'and laciviousconduct (Now McGloughlin I s an expert on
wha~'s possible through hypnosis.Let's not get an expert and conduct
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a proper investigation.)(Everyone in this case is a exprt except
the guy who was actually there. And of course we wouldn't want
any real proffesional to coroberate his testimony)
pg.205 ln.1 •• it just was a recipe for disaster in terms,of
any kind of defense.
But addressing that issue,! think certainly the defendant has
a right to present evidence to a jury,(well thats a relief)
and if they choose to do so in violation of the standards of ethics
or proffesional standards of attorneys,that the defendants can do
that pro-se,but they can't do it with the assistance of,or through
the direction of an attorney.(Correct me if I'm wrong,but did McGloughlin
just call Dalrymple a LIAR? If that's the case why doesn't he or
either of Dalrymples attorneys,or[the prosecuter for that matter]
want an investigation into this hypnosis?)(~veryone's an expertexcept the expert •• WHO"S NOT PRESENT)
ln.11 And I thought that Mr.Dangelo's explanation as to why
he would not be a part of such testimony was clear,and I can't find
that that was ineffective assistance of counsel per-se,(Let's see-Q
D Angelo refused to assist his client in any real manner then claims
conflict when he's called on his performance.And trys to lay the
blame for poor performance on his client.BUT HE GAVE A GOOD EXCUSE
SO THAT'S NOT INEFFECTIVE)(What does McGloughlin consider ineffective)
ln.14 to 15 •• and assuming that it was ,assuming that he should have
gone ahead and asked him that,A.he did testify that he had--I can't
find whether it came from Mr.Dalrymple examining himselfpro-se or
haveing Mr.D Angelo ask him those questions,But that fact in and
of itself would have changed the outcome of the verdict in this
case.(Sometimes it's hard to follow McGloughlins oration,He talks
alot of double-talk with no real meaning)(Whatever it was it would
have changed the verdict)ln.22 •• And then we talked about Mr.D Angelo's
effort to obtain an expert becouse that is a fair area of inquiry.
(Here we go again) I think Mr.D Angelo made a good faith effort to
try and find an expert.He talked to faculty at Boise State UNiversity
here.He had his investigater look into it. But even assuming that
his efforts in that regard were defitiant,I think I'd come back to
what I alluded to earlier. There is no evidence before this court
from a hypnotist that this testimony and the incredible suggestion
made to a child that she has been sexually abused,when in fact,
she has not been sexually abused,and for this theory or defense
imposed by Mr.Dalrymple,there's no showing that such a suggestion
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is even possible.Perhaps it is possible,but I'd have to speculate.
(With this statement McGloughlin hits two attorneys with one
stone.Niether D Angelo or Schwartz have presented any expert
testimony.They both claim they can't locate an expert,yet D Angelo
quotes the Iwakiri case which had two experts from boise,and
supposedly spoke to faculty at ~oise State who was knowledgeable
in hypnosis.Yet no one interviews his client or testifies in court.
Schwartz and Dalrymple have had conversations about this very
subject,and Dalrymple has supplied Schwartz with the names of books
on hypnosis.During cross examination he asks D Angelo about books,
Yet for some reason Swartz is under the impression that it is
unnesasary to present that evidence in lue of expert testimony.)
(Ineffective Assistance by both D Angelo and Schwartz)
pg.206 ln.14 •• The burden is upon the petitioner to show that,
a,this hypnosis occured,perhaps through

having a hypnotist

interview the victim,(Well look who just showed up to the party.)
(Where was that reasoning during trial,when he was making Dalrymple
discharge his attorney and proceed prp-se)? •• or review thier
testimony.Iwould simply have to speculate as to whether or not an
expert in hypnosis could have come in and said,Well this is all
not only possible,I just have nothing.(Now after the statements
McGloughlin just made,that point directly to glaring d@ficiencies
in both D Angelo's and Schwartz's presentations of Oalrymple's
case,he still manages to condone both attorney's

actions and excuses.)

pg.206 ln.22 •• And,again,I know that both Mr.D Angelo and,
frankly,Mr.Schwartz,you've tried today to do your best to find
somebody that could come in and kind of focus these issues and
structure them in a way where the court could look at this and say
okay,well,an expert has said he has an opinion that perhaps this
childs testimony had the kind of syntax and rythm to it that indicates
that she may have been hypnotized; That this kind of hypnotic
suggestion is possible,and could,infact,have taken place.It's all
speculation. And again,I

can't find that even though

he may have

--Mr.D Angelo may have perhaps taken additional steps to try and
connect with an expert in hypnosis,that even that was deficiant on
his part.(First McGloughlin congragulates them for doing there
•best•,Then he explains the evidence that's missing,Then he states
D Angelo could have done a better job locating an expert.Then
somehow he finds that's not defitiant.)He even goes on and says ••
pg~207 ln.13 •• there's been no showing here that the outcome of the
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case would have changed in any way.(With this statement he manages
to again point out Schwartz's ineffective assistance)
pg.207 ln.15 •• I hope I've addressed the issue of investigator's
claim of hypnosis.I think again Mr.Dangelo was constrained as far
as,to a certain extent,not only finding an expert on the subject
but what sort of contact,if any,would have been allowed with the
victim in this case in light of the no-contact order and the victim
rights.(D Angelo quoted Iwakiri which had two experts from Boise
in hypnosis,,On page 161 line 10 of post conviction tran. D Angelo
testified he spoke to a "Dr.Beaver""becouse we used him extensivly"
so,we can probably deduce D Angelo's testimony about not being able
to find an expert,is not true. And as far as contact with the victim
--Well acording to his own testimony •• He Never Tried!)
(McGloughlin has Double-Talked and contradicted himself in an
attempt to make D Angelo and Schwartz sound like hard working and
honest attorneys who had done a competent job for Dalrymple,When
in fact,That's just not true.)[On page 93 ln.12 post con.] D Angelo
states he was chief counsel for the Idaho Dept.of Health and Welfare
for about 11 years.That entailed representing seven divisions. The
Division of Welfare, The Division of Family and Childrens Services,
The Division of Enviromental Quality, The Division of Mental health
that ran The institutions at State Hospital South and North,And
the Idaho State School and Hospital, and the Division of Public
Health ••• Now, Considering this vast resevour of mental health
profesionals •• How could he not find somebody knowledgable in HYpnosis
whom his client could interview with? •• If as he says--He Tried.
Back on record Pg.207 ln.22 to Pg.20~.L~.23 is more Doubletalk
then on line 24 •• Mr.D Angelo tried to work around this whole issue
of this meeting between Mr.Dalrymple and the victim and the mother.
That was a real IMPEDIMENT(When did gathering possible evidence to
verify what your client was telling you become a IMPEDIMENT?)
Pg.209 Ln.1 •• That was a real IMPEDIMENT that was brought about by
Mr.Dalrymple's actions.Certainly not •• and it did IMPEDE Mr.D Angelo's
ability to manage this case and handle it in a normal amount of
time and effort and energy,and he took extra time,energy and effort
(OKAY the guy's a saint.We get it) to make additional contacts with
Mr.Dalrymple to try to work through this constant discusion about
this meeting process ••• (After McGloughlin nominates D Angelo for
sainthood he then )(ln.14 •• ) Mr.D Angelo's handling of the preparation
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of his client for trial was competent.It was profesional:It was
not defitient.He certainly went over these areas

that he was going

to cover with Mr.Dalrymple.It wasn't as though he got on the witness
stand cold.He adequetly prepared him for trial and for the issue
of testifying before the jury ••• (Except for that one little IMPEDIMENT
called evidence)
Ln.22 •• Again asking the witnesses questions about hypnosis,
I can't find --I mean,the testimony that was presented was that he
had hypnotized this child outside the presence of anyone eles,and
ther's certainly no evidence here that by asking the victim witness
to testify whether or not she'd been hypnotized,again,I don't profess
to be extremly knowledgeable about hypnosis,(Finaly, A statement
we can all agree on.And if your not knowledgable about hypnosis,
(Then stop making determinations about it,Or what Dalrymple is trying
to tell you •• CONTACT A PROFESSIONAL.) •• But that's kind of the whole
process.You've been hypnotized and you don't know it.
On pg.210 ln.7 •• (Mcgloughlin really begins to whitewash the
case) •• Again,even assuming that he'd asked a question about hypnotic
suggestion,There's been no showing here made that that would have
somehow changed the outcome of the case,As far as something for
the jury to consider.{Again,Ineffective assistance by Schwartz.)
I've touched upon this, allowing Mr.Dalrymple to testify about
hypnosis.He ultimatly,again,was allowed to testify about it.I've
talked about whether or not that was done through self-examination
by Mr.Dalrymple from representinghimself or from Mr.D Angelo,and
again,I can'tfind that ,though there was testimony here by Mr.
Dalrymple that he thought he looked perhaps idiotic asking himself
those questions, I can't find that that was a result of whether or
not he was asking the questions or his attorney was asking him the
questions •••
(RIDICULOUS!! I really don't understand why McGloughlin's
makeing statements like this.Wouldn't it be easier to jus~ admit
D Angelo didn't do his job and the court errored in coercing
Dalrymple who was unprepared and untrained to be pro-se in the
middle of the trial.Why continue to lie about how it didn't affect
the defense? Honestly I feel dumber for having read McGloughlin's
assesments.It's like he's talking to stupid children.Doesn't he
realize how much money and time he's caused to be wastedon the
incompetent performances of D Angelo and now Schwartz? And every
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time he says-"There's been no showing,or,no evidence presented here,
or,I can't find from the totality of the record any evidence before
the court here today~ He makes the case for ineffective assistance,
both at trial and at post-conviction.Becouse if either D Angelo or
Schwartz had done a proper job of representing thier client the
evidence wouldhave been there.)(Although judging from McGloughlin's
statements,He would have found a way to ignore that also.)
Pg.210 Ln.24 •• He says it was hurtfull and prejudicial to his
case,again,I cannot find from the record before the court that,even
assuming that,I just don't see where there was prejudice.(Dalrymple's
attorney completly failed to challenge the prosecutions case,Refused
to investigate,Abandoned his clients only defense,and Claimed a
Conflict existed that prevented him from assisting Dalrymple. The
Court in response to this revelation Coerced Dalrymple into A Pr0-se
defense that was unprepaired,and without physical evidence.
DALRYMPLE TRIED TO TESTIFY IN THE NARATIVE BUT DUE TO PROSECUTOR
OBJECTIONS AND THE COURT'S INTERFERANCE WAS UNABLE TO TESTIFY ABOUT
HYPNOSIS.DALRYMPLE'S TESTIMONY WITHOUT COROBERATING EVIDENCE TO
VERIFY HIS STATEMENTS WAS A FOOLS ERRAND.WHEN MCGLOUGHLIN HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT HE CHOSE TO COERCE DALRYMPLE INTO A PRO-SE
DEFENSE RATHER THAN HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE
CONFLICT.HE WOULDN'T EVEN MENTION THE CONFLICT UNTIL AFTER THE JURY
HAD GONE TO DELIBERATE,THEREBY DEPRIVEING DALRYMPLE OF THE OPORTUNITY
TO REQUEST A HEARING.SOMEHOW HE JUSTIFIED MAKEING DANGELO STANDBY
COUNSEL AFTER HE CLAIMED CONFLICT ••• ! GUESS IT SHOULD COME AS NO
SURPRISE WHEN HE CAN'T FIND PREJUDICE.)
Then on Pg.211 Ln.3 it's as if McGloughlin can't keep himself
from saying dumb shit ••• He got the testimony out.He was able to
describe what he did.The jury got to consider it as an issue.He
got to present his defense.I can't find that,again,the fact that
Mr.Dalrymple elicited that testimony from himself versus through
his attorney,that that rose to the level of either,A,ineffective
assistance of counsel,or that it would have changed the outcome
of the case.(APARENTLY MCGLOUGHLIN BELIEVES DEFENDANTS DON'T NEED
OR DESERVE THE BENIFIT OF COUNCEL TO PRESENT THIER DEFENSE.)
Pg.211Ln.12 •• Yes,there were objections about which Mr.Dalrymple
had been warned regarding form of questioning--The rules of evidence,
but again

that was a

risk he chose to take.(DALRYMPLE HAD OPPORTUNITY

TO BE PRO-SE BEFORE THIS TRIAL BEGAN.IF DALRYMPLE HAD CHOSEN TO
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GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT COUNSEL THAT CHOICE WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE
THIS TRIAL COMMENCED.IN FACT EVERY TIME DALRYMPLE WAS QUESTIONED
ABOUT PROCEEDING WITHOUT COUNSEL HE STATES HE NEEDS AN ATTORNEY.
FOR MCGLOUGHLIN TO SAY DALRYMPLE CHOSE SELF REPRESENTATION IS A
GROSS MISSREPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS.)
Pg.211 Ln.16 •• Again I ruled that Mr.D Angelo was ethicaly
precluded(CHALLENGED)for going into this area for the reasons he
set forth here today,(D Angelo had testified HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND
DALRYMPLE'S DEFENSE AND IT DIDN'T MAKE SENCE TO HIM,AND DALRYMPLE
WAS ACTING STUPID,AND THAT HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT DALRYMPLE SAID
BECOUSE HE WAS GOING TO DO IDT HIS WAY.) Pg.211 Ln.18 •• and I do agree
that in order for Mr.Dalrymple to testify as to his abilities as
a hypnotist,there has to be some training,experiance or knowledge
that is over and above that of simply an individual.(NOW AGAIN
MCGLOUGHLIN'S AN EXPERT IN HYPNOSIS AND DALRYMPLE'S SIMPLE.)
LN.24 •• CERTAINLY,WE DO ALLOW A CERTAIN degree of opinion testimony,
But this is one that calls for expertise,And there's been no showing
showing here that,By a hypnotist or someonewho's experienced in
that area,that,in fact,a lesser standard is required.I think you'll
have to speculate.(INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY SWARTZ)
Pg.212 Ln.s •• so,again, a conclusory remark in the affidavit
was that he was forced to go to trial with no defense theory and
no lawyer,and to the contrary, he had an attorney that was prepared
and did cover his denials of any wrongdoing.As far as when he
testified,and he was allowed to present his defense theory.
Again,I can'tfind that the presentation of that defense theory
was in any way impacted,or to change the outcome of this case
becouse it was done Pro-Se versus through his counsel.(IF IT DOESN'T
MAKE ANY DIFFERANCE THEN WHY DO YOU SUPPOSE WE HAVE ATTORNEYS AT
ALL,AND WHY WOULD THE SUPREME COURT MAKE AN ISSUE OF EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.)(MCGLOUGHLIN'S MAKING STUPID,STUPID STATEMENTS)
Pg.212 Ln.17 •• Based upon those findings,the court then would
conclude that the totality of the evidence here,That there was not
ineffective assistance of counsel with that one somewhat minor,
exception,and that was whether or not Mr.D Angelo had fjully and
completly attempted to find an expert on hypnosis.And when you
look at the standard in Strickland again,i don't want to send the
higher court a conflicting ruleing on this:But I think it may be
that there could have been possibly a little more effort in that
area.I frankly cannot find from the totality of the evidence that
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that one issue rose to the level of ineffective assistance of
counsel.(MCGLOUGHLIN

HAS TAKEN FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE,FAILURE TO

GATHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE,FAILURE TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES,ABANDONED
G,LIENTS ONLY DEFENSE,D ANGELO'S CONFLICT OF INTREST,COMBINED WITH
A REFUSAL TO ASSIST IN HIS CLIENT'S DEFENSE •• THIS IS WHAT DANGELO
REDILY TESTIFYS TO HAVEING DONE.YET MCGLOUGHLIN SOMEHOW TRIMS IT
ALL DOWN TO "ONE MINOR EXCEPTION")
Pg.213 Ln.7 •• Again,even assuming that it had,I can't find from
the totality of the evidence before the court here today,That it
would have changed the outcome of this case.(ANOTHER STATEMENT OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY POST CONVICTION COUNSEL-SCHWARTZ)
(MCGLOUGHLIN BURIES THE ATTORNEY ON POST CONVICTION IN AN EFFORT
TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL ATTORNEYS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.)
In Ln.24 Mcglaughlin says "I find it interesting that clearly
Mr.Dalrymple wanted an expert in hypnosis •••
He then goes on to give an excuse why it doesn't matter.Then
delivers to D Angelo a final attaboy for his performance and
completly denies the petition for post conviction.
CONCLUSION.
This is not about whether Dalrymple was told his consttutional
rights.This is a question of what must Dalrymple do to get fair
treatment under those rights?
Dalrymple has maintained Actual Innocence,That he never commited
the physical acts upon Kelsea that were the baises for the conviction
of the sexual molestation charges.
Dalrymple clearly wanted to present hypnosis and evidence of
hypnosis as the foundation of his defense.
D Angelo's failure to investigate left Dalrymple unprepared
at his trial,and Schwartz'es representation on Post-Conviction
lacked that same component,Which was evidence of hypnosis.
Mcgloughlin denied Dalrymple Due Process at trial by coercing
him into a Pro-Se defense after his attorney declaired Conflict of
Interest,and not allowing any time to prepare.
Mcgloughlin failed to mention D Angelo's conflict when D Angelo
declared it,Thus depriving Dalrymple of a hearing on the matter.
(Dalrymple surely would have asked for new counsel AGAIN and
Mcgloughlin wanted to avoid that.)
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Mcgloughlin made a mockery of Dalrymple's Right To Counsel
by appointing D Angelo who had claimed Conflict as Standby eounsel.
Mcgloughlin would later claim Dalrymple had the benifit of counsel
throughout the trial.
Dalrymple has been denied his right to face his accusers and
present evidence in his defense.
During Post-Conviction McGloughlin continues the Denial of
Due-Process by ignoreing sworn testimony and then Condoning the
shortcomings of both Schwartz and D Angelo.
At both hearings Dalrymple has been Denied Due Process,and
due to these denials and the Ineffective Assistance of Both of
Dalrymple's counsels,There is a clear Indication that Dalrymple may
be Innocent of the charges against him.
Mr.Dalrymple's convictions should therefore be reversed in full
The sentences Vacated and the case remanded.
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the Pat Collins Show

The New Encyclopedia of Stage Hypnotism

The "Progressing to Sleep" Hypnotising Method
Face committee and say:" All right, everyone, let's all try the experience
of entering hypnosis together. You have co~e on stage for ~e purpose ?f
b in hypnotised, so here is your opPorturuty to get hypnotised. You will
e g
·
d' "d d tt ·
find it a very pleasant experience, so everyone give un tvi e a ention
and concentrate. You will become hypnotised.
"All ready. Relax in your chairs, place your feet flat on the floor and rest
your hands in your lap. Now direct your eyes ~edly at r_ne and you will
find your eyes quickly becoming heavy and tired. I ~11 count slowly
from one to ten, and by the time I reach ten your eyes will be dosed and
you will go to sleep, yet you will continue to hear me and will follow my
suggestions at all times."
Gesture towards the committee, while giving the suggestions. This
appears dramatic to the audience ~s well as holding the attention o~ the
subjects. Make sweeping passes with yo~ hands. Rereat the committee
encompassing gestureS over and over until everyone s eyes are closed.., ·,
"Notice how pleasant and relaxed you begin to feel _throughout y ·
entire body. You will note a sensation of warmth gtoWlng all about
and your eyes feel heavy and tired. All right, I :'ill count slowly ·
to ten now, and with every count your eyes will close more and
by the time I reach the count of ten, or before, dose your eyes do .
together and shut out the light. Ready. One ... two ... three ..
eyes dosing all down tight .. . Five ... six .. . seven. Close your
and let them rest. Eight ... nine ... ten. Eyes all closed together_
1
out the light. Eyes all closed tight!"
Glance over the entire committee; all subjects' eyes should
Continue: '1t feels so good to close those tired eyes. So good,
so tightly closed you cannot open them try as hard as you
tightly they are shut together. See how they stick."
In working with the entire committee as a unit, do not make
this "eyelid fixation" but continue directly on: "Forget all
eyes now and go to sleep. Go sound to sleep. You are
down deeply to sleep. Sleep. Go sound to sleep. Your breaths
ening as you drop down to sleep. Breathe deep and free, and .
you take sends you down deeper and deep to sleep. You are ·
relaxed and your head falls forward on your chest and, as your .. .

forward, you dr?p off into deep hypnotic sleep. [Head falls forward onto
~est_ by all subJects; any who do not respond to this action are quietly
dismissed. If someone in the audience has responded that
m.
. 't d
'
perso~
uwi e to come on stage and fill the emptied chair.] You are in hypn<>gs
and will follow instantly my every suggestion."
o
0

NOTE TO HYPNOTIST: Observe how this induction oom~nds one series of
sugges~s upon another: first, eye closure and dropping asleep; second, breath
deepening, producing sleep; third, bodily relaxation and head falling forward on
chest; ~urth, the suggestion that all suggestions will be responded to Immediately. This is a progressive-relaxation method of hypnotising that Pat Collins performs rapidly, directly to the point. She wastes no time and her show is paced f

action.

or

Pat Collins now goes to each hypnotised person in tum and lifts
'ht
. th.
.
anarm
stra1g up l1l e all' with the command that it is stiff and rigid and th
cannot move it; that they cannot lower it try as hard as they will. If aneY_
. one_ lo:W~rs the~ arm ~t pe~n is immediately dismissed. The empti:d
charr is unmed1ately filled with another tesPonsive volunteer. All subjects with the~ arms ?IP~ly upright and unable to move (Pat pulls on
each to ascertam the ngidity) are retained. She then suggests:
,

persons with their arm upraised are in hypnosis, and at the count of
' your arm will instantly fall relaxed to your side and when it hits
side you will be in deep hypnosis. You will forget all your inhibiand just hav~ a good time. Just let yourself go! Be prepared. to have
and easy swing time. You will instantly resPond to everything I tell
" The count is made, and all arms drop on the moment. The show is
to roll a la Pat Collins's fast-paced routining.
- TO HYPNOTIST: Observe how the Pat Collins's handling "mentally sets"
to .respond rapdly to her suggestions. Further, that suggestions
,to hypnotised persons should be clear and direct. Right on target! Pat
. ~ on the somnambulistic level of hypnosis, causing the subjects to
. quickly. She expects such reactions, and obtains such accordingly. She
to feature the reactions of one subject at a time. When wori<ing with a

in Hmlted stage space, this wori<s splendidly. By way of example, she
8

subject by name, as we'll now see.

PRECISION THERA

At the count of three ... double the feeling .. . 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... *
As I count you down ... subcon will take you back to the very first
time that feeling arose.
Going back in time now ... (8) ... younger and younger ... (7) ...
smaller and smaller ... back to being very, very small ... (6) the
feeling is strong ... (5) ... (4) ... (3) ... (2) ... (1) .. . Zero ... There
you are ... now go back to five minutes before the feeling arose and
tell me - what's happening? Alone or with someone .. . etc., etc.
Now - feel yourself getting smaller and smaller again, younger
and younger - and rise up above your present body and go back
along the time-line before your birth ... or to some time before the
cause of your present symptoms ... sometime before the sensitising
event or emotions occurred that sowed the seed for your present
problem - to a time perhaps when you felt warm - comforted supported and sustained - you know there was such a time so - be
there now .... when you're there, your head will nod. Good ... now
- come forward in time to a few moments before the event or
experience that created the sensitivity that is producing the unwelcome symptom ...
When you're there-your right index finger will rise ... and you'll
be able to tell me about it. You're there now - just a few minutes
before the causative event ... tell me ... where do you find yourself?
Have you been born? Are you alone or with someone? ... Intensify
the feeling ... clarify the picture at the count of three ... 1 ... 2 ... 3
... ,. What's happening now?
'Nothing'.
What do you feel?
'Nothing'.
Say 'I feel nothing because' ... and finish the sentence ... etc.

Jus•
yot
mu
tor-te
tha·
wh,

pg. 1

IN THE DISTRICT OF THE FORTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DAVID DALRYMPLE

Case No. CVPC13-14732

Plaintiff

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO
Defendant

REPLY TO NOTICE OF
INTENT TO DISMISS
SUCCESSIVE PETITION
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IDAHO CODE
~

19-4902

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Presentation of issue in prior prceedings,

Ineffective assistance of prior post conviction counsel may provide
sufficiant reason for permitting newly asserted allegationscor
allegations inadequatly raised in the initial application to be
raised in subsequent post-conviction application.
Schwartz v. State,2008, 177 P.3d 400, 145 Idaho
Relation-back doctrine
When asecond or successive application is presented because
because the initial application was summarily dismissed due to the
alledged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction counsel,
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate, because
failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative
of due process.
Schwartz v. State,2008
Time for proceedings
If an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has
been concluded,an inmate may file a subsequent application outside
of the one year limitation period if the court finds a ground for
relief asserted which for sufficiant reason was not asserted or was
inadequetly raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
Schwartz v.State, 2008
§ 19-4904

Right to counsel
Counsel should be appointed for petitioner seeking postconviction relief if the petitioner qualifies financially and
alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Hust v.State, 2009, 214 P.3d 668, 147 Idaho.
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§ 19-4904

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Necessity for free provision of counsel
If an applicant seeking post-conviction relief alleges facts
that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court
should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity
to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting
facts.
Gonzalez v. State,2011,254 P.3d

69, 151 Idaho

Adequacy of representation
Although petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed
in post-conviction proceedings in order to search the record for
possible nonfrivoious claims, he should be provided with a meaningful opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request
for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition
where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.
Plant v. State, 2006, 152 P.3d 629, 143 Idaho

§ 19-4906
Adequacy of counsel, grounds for relief
A post-conviction proceeding is usually the only method to
bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
State v. Yakovac, 2006, 2006 WL 3113540, Unreported
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REPLY TO INTENT TO DISMISS SUCCESIVE PETITION
I'm not sure I understand completly Judge Moody's explanation
why the court would dismiss my petition. On August l9,2013 I asked
the court to appoint counsel. The main reason being to assist in
the interpretation of court documents and trained expertise in
properly presenting briefs and pleadings, including evidence, to
the court.
On August 30,2013 JUdge Moody denied the motion for council
on the baises that the successive petition does not allege facts
to raise even the possibility of a valid claim.
I would ask you to reconsider.
It is not my intent to present incomplete or inadequate petitions
to the court. I am not trained in the law and have little or no
expertise. As you can tell by my fileing. I thought however that
an accusation substantiated with the record was and is fact.
Specificaly ••• (1) Trial counsel failed to investigate.
(2) Conflict of interest. (3) Dalrymple was constructivly denied
counsel. (4) Cumulative errors.
All of these allegations are are substantiated in the transcript
included in my Augest 19, 2013 filing. If for some reason the
transcripts failed to arrive on your desk I have once again included
them with this reply. They are Supreme Court Docket No. 36973 •••
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL. and •• Suppreme Court No. 31398 •• Case NO.
H0301506 •• H0301629 •• APPEAL TRANSCRIPT ••• and Supreme Court No.31398
Case No. H0301506 •• H0301629 ••• APPEAL TRANSCRIPT(SUPPLEMENTAL).
DAngelo admits his investigation lacked substance. He didn't
even try to interview Shelley or Kelsea. Which he testifies his
client continually requested he do. He failed to subpoena physical
evidence his client told him existed to substantiate his claims of
hypnosis.And,He failed to secure an expert in hypnosis to interview
his client or Kelsea. Which again,His client requested he should
do if he intended to represent him properly.
Dalrymple respectfully asks Judge Moody.
Since DAngelo has admitted to these deficiencies in his
performance. Doesn't that make them fact?~. And accordingly,
prove his representation of Mr.Dalrymple. was ineffective? And,
Demonstrate to the court that Dalrymple may have been convicted
for acts he did not commit?
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Judge Moody also asks why Dalrymple's other claims were not
raised in his initial petition for Post Conviction relief?
(1) The District Courts refusal to allow testimony from a key
wittness (2)Involuntary choice to represent himself,and the courts
coercion.(3) Denial of Constitutional Rights through the courts
conduct & decisions. (4) Competency to stand trial.?
The answer to Judge Moody's question in part is,I don't know.
Cristopher Schwartz,who was the attorney handeling the initial
Post-Conviction,informed me he would be happy to put Kelsea on the
stand providing she would testify to the hypnosis. To my knowledge
Mr.Schwartz never followed that thought up with an interview of
Kelsea,and like Dangelo before him he failed to secure an expert
in hypnosis,and failed to determine the existence of hypnotically
implanted false memories.
When I arrived at the hearing that evidence and wittness were
once again,conspicuously absent. Mr.Schwartz did however explain
that he believed the testimony fromKelsea ,or,expert testimony,
would not be necessary because he believed Dangelo's admission
of his poor handeling of the case along with the record would be
enough to overturn the convictions.
I cannot answer as to why Mr.schwartz chose to ignore every
other issue in the record.But I'm confident that an attorneys fast

& loose handeling of a case is somthing the court has seen before.
As I read Judge Moody'sNotice Of Intent To Dismiss,on page 5
she states Dalrymple has not demonstated or alledged any specific
ground for relief raised in his initial Post-Conviction Petition.
was inadequetly presented by counsel.
I don't know what Judge Moody is looking for here. I don't
understand what needs to be presented. I'm sure it exists I just
don't know how to present adequetly to the court.
I think,or thought, Ineffective assistance of counsel would
be areasonable conclusion when all the issues are not presented.
The record shows inadequetly raised issues by Schwartz.Evidence is
not brought,or even investigated in order to substantiate the @!aims
that were brought. I submitted the record of the initial Post Conviction hearing because Judge McLaughlin focusess on the
deficiencies in Schwartz's presentation. The record is evidence
of ineffective asisstance. What more do I need?
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To Judge Moody respectfully.
Whatever I need to submit to the court to establish factual
basis,other than the record,I would happily submit. Just tell me
what it is.
In her Motion To Summarily Dissmiss Jean Fisher first attempts
to misslead the court by stateing there was ten counts of lewd
conduct.She knows that's not true. She claims the evidence I
wanted to present was undisclosed. She knows that Dangelo had been
informed,and she came to trial armed with case law on hypnosis
and used that case law to prevent Dalrymple's testimony about
hypnosis. In fact Dalrymple asserted collusion between jean Fisher
and Dangelo, and testified his grounds for makeing such an
acusation was Jean Fisher's preparidness with case law readily
available about hypnosis.
Jean Fisher states Dalrymple testified as an"expert'!
Thats not true. Dalrymple never testified as an "expert" nor did
he attempt to. In fact, Dalrymple has consistetly maintained he
was not an expert,and, That an expert was needed to evaluate his
statements and interview Kelsea.
I don't know why,but on page 2 Fisher focuses on a "release
date". Or says things like,She would"wake"up from her hypnotized
state. Here Fisher selects partial statements and uses them out of
context. Another attempt to misslead.
I did in fact try to instill in Kelsea's thinking a time period
when she could inform her mother she was not molested.And Kelsea's
not asleep. I have no communication with Shelley or Kelsea and I
don't know how this suggestion played out. Jean Fisher attempts to
misrepresent the facts to suit her agenda.
Jean Fisher knows and recognizes the necessity of an expert
in hypnosis to substantiate Dalrymple's claims. She also recognizes
Dangelo's and Schwartz's failure to secure an expert,or even attempt
to lay proper foundation. So I guess I don't understand her argument.
An expert was requested by Dalrymple;before trial,after trial,and
during trial.Dalrymple's counsel refused to investigate. That's all
true. Why is she arguing? We're in agreement. Let's call an expert.

pg.7

I don't have access to a real law library. It's impossible
for me to research and quote cases. Jean Fisher has me at a huge
disadvantage in that regard. I do however have the facts to my
advantage, Providing we move past the distortions

of the

prosecutor's office.
While I don't have access to experts in hypnosis, once again
I have the facts. I also have the next best thing to an expert.
Which is experts through books.
(Cristopher Schwartz questioned Dangelo about books on hypnosis,
yet never presented them as evidence.) (Improper presentation.)
During his testimony Dangelo focused on a countdown method! for
induction into hypnosis. Dangelo testified Dalrymple had explained
this method to him during an interview at the Ada County jail
prior to trial. He also testified he spoke with a Dr. Beaver, and
explained the method to him. Dangelo claims Dr.Beaver told him
the method was not possible.
I am submitting to the court excerpts from
The Encyclopedia Of Stage Hypnotism, by Ormond McGill.
Precision Therapy, by Duncan McColl.
Scripts & Strategies in Hypnotherapy, by Roger P. Allen.
Each Author presented is an Expert in thier area of practice.
And while there are many methods of induction, the only ones I
am presenting today make use of a countdown.
The submission of these exibits is intended to add credibility
to Dalrymple's statement of method,and,debunk the testimony of
Dangelo.
It is my hope these exibits will persuade the court to take
a closer look. There was at the time of trial,physical evidence,
in the form of journal & tapes & computer, which Dangelo & Schwartz
refused to subpoena from Shelley. And of course the interview
and testimony of Kelsea.
I have not had communication with Shelley or Kelsea and will
require the assistance of the court in gathering more evidence.
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Due process issues improperly presented,or inadequetly raised
in the original petition,justify the fileing of successive postconviction claims of Ineffective Assistance of counsel.
As to the issue of Time-Barred.
Jean Fisher once again attempts to misslead the court. While
Ms.Fisher claims 4 years has passed since the original Post-conviction
was dismissed,and she may be correct,She is not correct however in
using that date to do her tolling.
Idaho Code ss 19-4902 Requiers that Post-Conviction petitions
be filed within one year from the experation of the time for appeal,
or from the determination of an appeal, or fromthe determination
of a proceeding following an appeal.
The last fileing in this case is •••
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Case No.12-35320
Filed Sep.19,2012
I will include a copy of the filed order.
It is my understanding this is the Date when tolling for this
fileing began. The fileing date for this current petition is
August 19,2013. Dalrymple asks Judge Moody to
properly filed for time. Thank You.

finfl~,11~P7'ition
uJ/;J:'
David Dalrymple.
Petitioner.
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The request for a certificate of appealability is denied. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253( c)(2). All pending motions, if any, are denied as moot.

